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Abstract 
Corruption is an international issue that gets the recognition of the 
United Nations. International day was assigned to exchange ideas, sharing 
knowledge, to revitalize the commitment as well as to devise new strategies 
concerning this securitized matter of all member states. Besides, the UN 
provided convention that has been ratified by states of the world. Ethiopia is 
one of those which have signed this convention and currently 
institutionalized the ‘cosmetic’ anti-corruption practice. Yet, things have a 
different scenario in Ethiopia; its political systems are deficient in 
democratic power sharing formula, check and balance, accountable and 
transparent institutions and procedures. These deficits of democracy are 
clearly observed when one compares the significant steps of the country’s 
transition from its authoritarian legacy to the current ‘rhetoric’ good 
governance experience of the country. The artificial nature and the failure of 
the country's transformation to democratic governance and its legacy to the 
deficit of the political system open the door to corruption and facilitated the 
fertile breeding ground for this political gangrene. This article argued that the  
perpetuation of political corruption on the part of the incumbent government 
in Ethiopia, significantly aborted the country’s democratization process, 
eroded the country’s rule of law, prevail a politicization of the country’s civil 
service system, as well as the monopolization of the country’s economy. 
 
Keywords: Political corruption, good governance, democratic governance, 
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Introduction 
Contemporarily, corruption has not only become a hot issue in the 
academic sphere, but it also has securitized and institutionalized in the 
various multilateral, governmental and non-governmental institutions. 
However, despite a high agenda in the current undertaking of various states 
and institutions, it is not a new phenomenon. It ‘has been persistent 
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throughout history and across political system in many different forms and 
degrees’ (Bicchieri & Duffy, 1997, p. 477).Yet, its current reverberation can 
be explained mainly by the legacy of the Cold War which ‘has stopped the 
political hypocrisy that had made the decision makers in some industrial 
countries ignore the political corruption that existed in a particular 
countries…as long as the latter were in the right political camp’ (Tanzi, 
1998, p. 560). Besides, the role-played by non-governmental institution, the 
United Nations, and particularly the USA ‘through its influence in some 
international institution, has been important’ (ibid., p. 556). In the academic 
realm, corruption as a subject of study can be treated with respect to the tenet 
and the parameter of various concerned disciplines respectively. 
Accordingly, using the political factors into account, Political Science has 
attempted to analyze corruption as a deviation from the rational-legal values 
and principles of modern state, and ‘approached the phenomena of 
corruption in terms of regime type and searched for its causes in 
authoritarianism versus democracy and in developmental oriented regimes 
verses neo-patrimonial rule’ (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & 
Søreide, 2000, p. 51). Political corruption is an outcome and a major 
symptom of poor governance or it is a sign of ‘state which is functioning 
poorly’ (Hope, 2000, p. 9). In other words, corruption is a manifestation of 
poor performance of a particular polity. Conventionally, ‘it is understood as 
caused by political systems that are deficient in democratic power sharing 
formula, check and balance, accountable and transparent  institution and 
procedures of the formal and ideal system of democratic governance’ (Doid 
and Theobald, cited in Andvig, et al., 2000, p. 52). 
In the context of Ethiopia as Haberson posits (cited in Merera, 2003, 
p.145) ‘the dual transition, from an ethnically dominated empire to an 
ethnically egalitarian nation state and from authoritarian rule to democracy’ 
couldn’t realize democratic governance in Ethiopia. There remains a gap 
between the rhetoric and the reality, between the declaration and the 
implementation of the genuine democratization. In Ethiopian political system 
one can witness the ‘deficits of democracy…when one compares the 
significant steps of transition with normative standards’ (Vestal, cited in 
Merera, 2000, p. 190). The artificial nature and the failure of the country’s 
transformation to democratic governance and its legacy to the deficit of the 
political system once again open the door to corruption and facilitated the 
fertile breeding ground for the political gangrene. When the incumbent 
regime came to power, it propagated solemnly to institute a democratic 
government to resolve the age-old legacy of the country in which ‘the classic 
Ethiopian polity has been characterized by a heavy dosage of 
authoritarianism’ (Bahiru, 2002, p.11). However, we are experiencing 
practically the division from the guiding principles, the promised good 
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governance are not achieved, rather the wide spread corruption perpetrated 
by the EPRDF (Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front) poses 
serious challenge and ‘it undermines the country’s good governance by 
subverting formal process’ (UNDP, 1999, p.15) for the sake of the regime 
security as well as the uninterrupted continuation of its tenure. This can be 
manifested through the political and economic state capture of the regime in 
power, its neo-patrimonial rule as well as weak institutional framework. As a 
consequence, what can be observed as a legacy of EPRDF’s perpetration of 
political corruption is the aborted democratization of the country, the erosion 
of the rule of law, the monopolization of the Ethiopian Economy as well as 
the politicization of the civil service in Ethiopia. Thus, it is against this 
background that this article attempts to examine the above mentioned 
problems of the political corruption of the regime in power against the 
rhetoric ‘good governance’ undertaking. 
 
Political Corruption in the post 1991 Ethiopia 
Political corruption can develop and flourish as a result of structural 
deficiency in the political administrative system of a given country. In 
broader terms, this phenomenon is the apparent prerequisite, but not the 
sufficient condition for political corruption to exist. Essentially, the various 
causes of political corruption as ‘summed up in the literature are in the first 
place, the increasing complexity of the functioning of the public 
administration due to unclear laws and indistinct prescriptions ... a second 
possible cause is the lack of financial control on the executives power… 
thirdly, there are political appointments…[in which politicians] increase their 
power by means of appointing friends to important positions…and finally 
there is the fact that public and private sectors have become intertwined’ 
(Robben, 1998, p. 221-22). 
In the context of Ethiopia, the widespread manifestation of corruption 
is the norm that the state is functioning as a part and parcel of its mega 
system of politics. In the contemporary Ethiopia, ‘corruption flourishes…as 
institutions are weak and as the rule of law and formal rules are not 
rigorously observed; as the political patronage is rife and as the civil society 
lack the means to generate public pressure’ (Abebe, 2004, p. 5). 
Comprehensively, the significant causes of political corruption in Ethiopia 
are ‘poor governance, lack of accountability and transparency, low level of 
democratic culture and tradition, lack of citizen participation, lack of clear 
regulation and authorization, low institutional control, extreme poverty and 
inequality, harmful cultural practices, …centralization of authority and 
resources, family and ethnic loyalties and obligations, blurred distinction 
between private and public interests, privatization, weak financial 
management, inadequate accounting and auditing, weak legal and judicial 
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system, over regulated bureaucracy, deterioration of acceptable moral and 
ethical values, desire to want more, unsound policies and, most importantly 
inefficient civil service system’(FEAC, 2005, p. 3-4). When one analyzes 
these numerous factors as the core causes of political corruption in Ethiopia, 
he/she finds that they are overlapping each other as well as some of the 
factors can accommodate the rest; therefore, one can boil down these 
multitude factors into three categories for the sake of simplification as well 
as analyzing each of them effectively. Accordingly, state capture, weak 
institutional framework and neo-patrimonial rule are taken as the major 
causes of political corruption that are best explained the proliferation of 
political corruption perpetrated by the regime in power as far as this article is 
concerned. These interrelated causes that show the EPRDF’s version of 
political corruption as well as its modus operandi will be discussed in the 
next section of this article in relation to their negative impact against the 
‘good governance experience’ of Ethiopia.  
 
Political Corruption and Good governance in Ethiopia 
In an attempt to qualify the phenomena of political corruption, it is 
believed that corruption is both a prime effect and a major cause of poor 
governance. Within this vicious circles setting, it has several deleterious 
effects on good governance of a particular country. Yet, its debilitating 
impact varies accordingly, depending on the level of political development 
as well as the degree of political culture. The litany effects of political 
corruption on the state can ultimately contribute to the paralysis of its 
institutional set up since it has repercussions on the rule of the political game 
and the operating rules of the political system. These negative repercussions 
can be compartmentalized into philosophical, psychological, political, and 
economical aspects. In its philosophical aspect, its impacts pushed forward 
the adherences to ‘cynicism and nihilism of citizens and it may also be 
nurtured by these (kinds of perceptions)’ (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, 
2000, p. 50-51). In its psychological dimension, it ‘affects professionalism… 
in the public servants and leads to frustration on the part of few honest public 
servants to the extent that they emigrates’ (Hope, 2000, p. 25). Consequently, 
this in turn contributes to brain drain dilemma of educated people, 
administration inefficiency and parasitism. The effect of corruption on 
politics is that, it renders the state incapacitated and impotent. With these 
negative impacts, political corruption is ‘destructive to the state’s ability to 
extract taxes, implement coherent and rational development policies, 
redistribute resources among groups and regions, and consequently to its 
ability to transform the society and the economy accordingly to political 
priorities’ (Andvig, et al., 2000, p. 60). However, the most glaring problem 
of political corruption in a given country is that ‘the general public may not 
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put any trust in the leadership and its administration which in turn discourage 
them from actively participating in government activities....This will 
definitely deter a democratization process in a given country’ (FDRE-MFA, 
2005, p. 132). Moreover, it has a negative relationship with the rule of law, 
and it affects institutional quality of the political system, in which ‘countries 
with more corruption experiences lower acceptances of established 
institutions, weakened political institutions and a deficient court system’ 
(Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005, p. 8). 
Political corruption has a repercussion on the institutional quality of a 
given country and the apparent injustices. It ‘may also weaken the judicial 
system of a country thereby facilitating the abuse of human and democratic 
rights of the general public’ (FDRE-MFA, 2005, p. 132).  The judiciary as 
the ‘central entity in the regulatory process for purposes of fair play’ 
(Bukurura, 1999, p. 109) as well as “the custodian of most, if not all, of the 
ideas that go with the rule of law and human rights’ (ibid.) compromised and 
unable to carry out its expectation as an essential pillar in the emerging era of 
political pluralism. In its economic aspects, political corruption has negative 
impacts on the level of economic development. As the ‘regression analysis 
indicates, the amount of corruption is negatively linked to the level of 
investment and economic growth; that is to say, the more corruption, the less 
investment and the less economic growth’ (Mauro, 1998, p. 9). This is due to 
the fact that it is ‘the single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development’ (WB, 2004, p. 21). It has significantly harmful impact on those 
‘determinants of economic welfare like, e.g. the level of per capita/GDP and 
its growth rate, the quality of the public infrastructure, public expenditure 
allocation, total investment and foreign direct investment’ (Dreher & 
Herzfedld, 2005, p. 3). As a whole, political corruption also poses threats to 
the security and stability of countries in different parts of the world. In this 
regard, Muganda (1999, p. 43) generalizes the debilitating impacts of 
political corruption and notes that ‘corruption subverts political stability and 
becomes a serious impediment to the democratic process by interfering with 
free elections, law enforcement and judiciary process”. These are all being 
the general effects of political corruption on the democratic governance of 
the state.  
In case of Ethiopia, I argue that the impact of political corruption on 
the country’s ‘good governance’ experience, has in fact seriously affected 
the country’s political system, its political and economic undertakings as 
well as its judicial institutions. Most specifically, the widespread 
perpetuation of political corruption on the part of the incumbent government 
in Ethiopia, significantly aborted the country’s democratization process, 
eroded the country’s rule of law, prevail a politicization of the country’s civil 
service system, as well as the monopolization of the country’s economy. As 
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a consequence, its resultant effects brought about the deficiency of the 
political system in the country. Thus, in the next subsequent subsections the 
manifestation and the impacts of the perpetrated political corruption in 
Ethiopia will be treated briefly. 
 
Aborted Democratization 
When I said to be the democratization process of Ethiopian is 
aborted, it is a transition in which the overall outcome of this process 
manipulated, dictated and controlled by the party in power as a project of 
political state capture. This is because, the political system of Ethiopia is not 
as such a product of political bargain, genuine competition and a national 
conesus of an inclusive approach to governance. It is rather a winner-take-all 
mentality outcome of political craftsmanship of the EPRDF. In this process 
of camouflage democracy, the EPRDF using its omnipresence and 
overarching control of matters all over the country has institutionalized state 
capture. The overall arrangements of such a process leave a very little room 
to the citizens at large to influence the policy outcome. Viewing the 
beginning of the political arrangement of the state capture in Ethiopia, its 
subsequent evolution began in the July 1991, National Conference of Addis 
Ababa as calculated in advance by the EPRDF. In this historical junction, the 
EPRDF that assumed the central role of sending out invitations to the 
possible participants purposely left out its age old contending political 
organizations and invited ‘mostly ethnic liberation front’s, some of which 
were created by the EPRDF for the occasion’ (Vestal, 1999, p. 7). In this 
conference, as it was first envisioned and manipulated for its own political 
hegemony, ‘the EPRDF got its own charter approved… ensured its centrality 
in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) by controlling the key 
institutions of the state, the executives, the legislative and the judiciary 
branches of the government, together with the army, as well as the rest of the 
security apparatus’ (Merera, 2000, p. 183). 
Moreover, when one can analyze the successive periodic elections 
carried out in this country, he/she finds that the process as well as the actual 
undertaking is a serious of felonies perpetrated by the regime in power. In a 
zero sum game political culture, the EPRDF had been continued derailing the 
democratic process enshrined in the Charter. The harassments and 
intimidation of the EPRDF led TGE, as well as the various irregularities that 
were experienced during the preparation for the June 1992 election, 
pressurized member of the TGE political organization like OLF (Oromo 
Liberation Front) to boycott the election and to make withdrew from the 
TGE as a whole. In addition to OLF, other political parties like ‘the All 
Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), the Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of Oromo, the Gedeo Democratic Organization and the Ethiopia Action 
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Group withdrew from the elections questioning the fairness of the playing 
fields as well as the transparency of the rules of the game being applied’ 
(ibid., p. 184). With such exclusion of political parties that are denied of 
providing political alternatives to the people of Ethiopia, this in turn formally 
excluded ‘the citizenship right and … therefore debarred from any kind of 
political voice’ (Percy-Smith, 2000, p. 150). 
With the absence of unimpaired opportunities to formulate political 
preferences on the part of the Ethiopian electorate, ‘the EPRDF, which was 
both a referee and a player, ‘won’ a land slide victory, but the outcome was 
yet another nail in the country’s hope for democratic transition’ (Merera, 
2000, p. 184). The overall process was a kind of ‘one-step forward, two steps 
back rhythm of polices for the democratization of Ethiopia’ (Vestal, 1999, p. 
38). As the manifestation of its failure, the process of this particular election 
of the country since the coming to power of the EPRDF was a flawed one in 
many ways as it was acknowledged by the then time Transitional Period 
President Meles Zenawi as well as the National Democratic Institute /African 
American Institute, which contributed the largest contingent to the Joint 
International Observer Group concluded that ‘to the disappointment of many 
Ethiopians and their friends in the international community, the June 21 
elections represented a sterile, surreal and wholly formalistic affair’ 
(NDI/AAI, 1992, p. 6-7). In consequence, what can be taken out from the 
outcome of  this election is that ‘in the eyes of greater part of the Ethiopian 
public and foreign observers, the June 1992 elections were neither, “free and 
fair’, nor did they help the institutionalization of multiparty democracy in the 
country’ (Merera, 2004, p. 252). Rather in the name of democratic election, 
it instituted the wish of the EPRDF and heralded the hegemony of the ruling 
party as logical outcome of its political calculus. 
Likewise, the previous one, the 1994 Constituency Assembly 
elections were also ‘more exclusive than the June 1992 election as more 
opposition groups were pushed out of the game and were further 
marginalized’ (ibid.). Once again EPRDF became victorious in ‘the race of 
EPRDF against EPRDF’ (Kassahun, 1994, p. 5). As the further 
crystallization of the political state capture to its vision for hegemonic 
aspiration, the ‘EPRDF members and sympathizers assumed such positions 
as a chair person, vice-chairperson, and secretary of the Drafting 
Commission (of the constitution); there by ensuring control of matters 
pertaining to the subject in question’ (Kassahun, 2003, p. 132). This 
constitution as the bigger framework for the restructuring of the body politics 
of Ethiopia, ethnicity was highly inculcated for reordering of the state 
structure along this line. Theoretically, the validity of this political move 
emanate from its attempts to remove the national oppression legacy of the 
country prior to 1991 however, practically the overall politics of the country 
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geared towards single ethnic group hegemony and self centered political and 
economic benefits, namely for EPRDF party home base. In the party politics 
scene of the political state capture, from the beginning, “the EPRDF 
leadership, which has been conscious of political implication of its policies 
quickly moved to create a surrogate ethnic organization of its own for almost 
all ethnic groups in the country” (Merera, 2003, p. 123). Most importantly, 
these satellite or surrogate ethnic based organizations “are not locally and 
independently initiated political groups, but TPLF created ‘People’s 
Democratic Organizations’ for the control of non-Tigryan ethnic groups of 
the country’ (ibid.) or in other words, these satellite organizations ‘were 
created to compete with and undermined non-conformists from influencing 
matters in a manner that would be detrimental to the EPRDF’s hegemonic 
aspirations’ (Kassahun, 2003, p. 120). 
This prior political calculus of EPRDF for the realization of the badly 
needed and highly valued political state captures, the ‘infamous people’s 
democratic organizations (PDOs) helped the ruling party to speak through 
the mouth of several dozen ethnic groups, mushroomed across the country’ 
(Merera, 2003, p. 123). Thus, all those ethnic based PDOs have been easily 
manipulated for the best interest of their creator and played a channel for the 
long stick of the TPLF’s powers, where TPLF used these PDOs as 
instrument to impose its hegemonic agenda on the politics of the country at 
large. Besides, its hierarchical arrangement of the party, its instruments of 
PDOs and their significance position of administrating their respective 
region, TPLF benefited from the prevailing deep down centralized decision 
making and controlling machination to ensure the continuity of its core 
interest and hegemony. To safeguard this arrangement in case for diversion, 
‘TPLF assigned hard-core cadres, who have right to supervise the actions 
and performance of the PDOs at all level, implement the decision made by 
the TPLF/EPRDF leading bodies’ (ibid., p. 146). This modus operandi of the 
country’s political settings politically enabled the EPRDF to benefit 
immensely and it resulted in a system where the party capitalized all the 
political fruits’ of the country. This advantage is visible in a way that the 
parties can ‘speak through the mouth of all other ethnic groups, win elections 
and rule the country in the name of all the peoples of Ethiopia’ (ibid). The 
outcome of this entire political move crystallized, the situation all in the 
hands of TPLF where ‘the TPLF practically controls the central government 
by occupying the key post of the Prime Minster and the Foreign Ministry as 
well as the key posts in the Army, the Police and the Security structure’ 
(Merera, 2003, p. 147). 
When we come to the 1995 regional and national elections of the 
nations, the process was also a replica of its predecessor and it was ‘the final 
act which accompanied the EPRDF goal of in the situation that ‘no 
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independent party worthy of its name participated in this election, and in the 
absence of major opposition parties; such as, OLF, AAPO, EPRP43, 
MELSON44, COEDF45, Medhin and CAFPDE46. The EPRDF repeated its 
landslide victory to form an EPRDF- led second republic’ (ibid., p. 18). Most 
importantly, what was observed in this election is that opposition parties 
boycotted this particular election as a result of continued atmosphere of 
intimidation, harassment and the various overt and covert obstacles initiated 
by the EPRDF. Viewing these injustices of the EPRDF against the 
opposition parties as well as the absence of alternatives views to voters, 
Ottaway (1995, p. 71) commented the process as ‘flawed…and an extension 
of the drive and machinations that put in place to ensure the preponderance 
and omnipotence of the ruling EPRDF’. On its part, the Norwegian 
Observers Group of researchers Tronvoll and Aadland (1995, p. 59-60) who 
follows the process of the elections also come up with a similar analysis of 
the flawed nature of the elections process and according to their report: 
[They] cannot characterize the 1995 regional and federal elections in 
Ethiopia as ‘free, fair and impartial’. Conducting election as a mere 
formality and claiming democracy without having democratic public debates 
is a futile exercise […] the 1995 elections were not based on inclusive 
discussion. They did not allow free competition between all legal political 
alternatives […] Thus [they] cannot considered that these elections can be 
considered free and fair. They were not sufficient as an indicator of a 
democratic debate or even of a process toward developing a democratic 
society.  
What is to be concluded from the successive elections conducted 
under the guise of rhetoric democratic elections with the leadership of 
EPRDF regime is that ‘the political system has changed little, with the 
exception of cosmetic changes in terms of a procedures and mechanisms, and 
actual political activity’ (Kassahun, 2003, p. 130). In the final analysis, what 
is to be put as rubber stamp, at the end in any of the elections is that the rule 
of the game governing multi-party democracy and ‘free and fair’ elections 
were not observed in any of them under the EPRDF rule. The kind of 
window dressing democratization process of Ethiopia that could at the end 
institute a de facto one party state in this country is often allegedly squanders 
the legitimacy of the EPRDF leadership in particular and its architected 
political system of the country in general. Since the legitimacy of a given 
political system goes beyond the holding of period elections, the EPRDF 
initiated democratization that are characterized by the absence of a consensus 
                                                          
43 Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party 
44 Amharic acronym for All Ethiopian Socialist Movement 
45 Coalition of Ethiopia Democratic Forces 
46 Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia 
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oriented approach as well as a meaningful participation of political 
associations as a result of the ruling party manipulation of the process using 
endless tricks, has not been bestowed  legitimacy. This is due to the fact that 
it ‘would be a mistake to equate democracy with regular elections’ (UNDP, 
2002, p. 54) on the part of EPRDF-sponsored transition that ‘fall into the 
fallacy of electoralism’ (ibid.) and it can be explained by its fear of free and 
fair elections. On the part of this regime, its fear of free and fair election is 
directly related to the nature of the Ethiopian state. As its inherent nature ‘the 
state in Ethiopia is prized as the major avenue of accumulation of wealth, 
privileges and status’ (Mesfin, 1993, p. 33). The EPRDF government has 
always been in secured to let go this badly needed avenue. It has the 
perception that it achieved its current political reality not as such as an 
outcome of a ballot box, rather as a result of political and economic 
hegemony; if there is a free and fair election in Ethiopia, it can lose this 
golden opportunity of self-aggrandizement. 
 
Violation of Freedom of Association and Expression 
In connection to the democratization process of EPRDF, the other 
dismal picture of the current political setting is that ‘EPRDF’s democracy’ 
doesn’t equate with freedom of expression and assembly…starting with its 
inception, the regime has not been tested in terms of these expressions of 
democracy’ (Mebratu, 2004a, p. 19). In contrary to the right of associations 
of the population at large, the EPRDF has always been squeezed, 
emasculated and onslaught independently organized mass associations. In its 
divisive move against the existence of these organizations, the regime goes a 
greater length to instituted its lackey mass organizations that are rival one to 
the previously organized independent mass organization; in order to make it 
possible, these organizations as instruments of achieving political 
socialization of the regime, not only in terms of ‘carried out political, 
executive, and organizational work in such way as to enable party directives 
to be correctly understood and implemented by the population at large’ 
(Vestal, 1999, p. 145). It also amasses contributions, channelizing political 
recruitments to the party’s memberships as well as communicating political 
feedback to the regime in power. Yet, the curtailment of the freedom of 
associations and the continued intervention on the part of EPRDF leadership 
to undermine the independent existences of mass organizations using a direct 
and indirect punitive measure is against Article 31 of its highly regarded 
constitution. In spite of this article of the FDRE constitution that enshrined 
the basic rights of Ethiopians to join with others in pursuit of political, social 
and economic ends, the EPRDF marginalized and forced such kinds of 
associations to operate under continuous harassment while their leaders 
faced detentions, torture, and dismissal from their jobs as well as their 
European Scientific Journal   December 2013  edition vol.9, No.35  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
260 
 
associations. By a way of expressing the EPRDF rejections, the freedom of 
assembly and its continual intervention in the internal affairs of the mass 
organization, Mebratu (2004a, p. 19) upholds that: 
The EPRDF was not taken with the teacher association formed by 
exercising the right to assemble; it established a rival one set them against 
each other. When ultimately both associations became spent due to the 
squabbling, teachers became bereft of an association that protected their 
interests. When the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Union (CETU) was 
established under the leadership of Ato Dawi Ibrahim; a person whom 
EPRDF regarded as being dependable, it run short of words to extol its 
democraticness in the belief that it had put the confederation  in its palms 
without creating a competitor. But when Ato Dawi began to adopt a position 
is differing from the EPRDF’s concerning workers, and to argue that the 
EPRDF was sideling workers […] is vowed to “destroy” him. Since it is an 
organization that displays concern only for itself and not workers, it fond the 
criticism to be unpalatable. So it exerted pressure to have Ato Dawi removed 
and simultaneously endeavored to establish another workers associations. 
However, as it didn’t want a repeat of Ato Dawi’s “rebelliousness”, it created 
an association that couldn’t stand by workers in their time of hardship let 
alone protect their interest. Consequently, there was as far as promulgated a 
law that “send workers down the drain”, that denies them the rights to be 
paid severance pay upon termination of employment contract. This is how 
the EPRDF “eat away” associations and enfeebles them. 
In light of the freedom of associations, the freedom of press is also 
‘one of the benchmark’s of the existences of a true belief in democracy, [and 
it] is the ability to entertain diverse opinions whether or not they conform to 
each other; or not to prevent the expression of ideas’ (ibid., p. 17). Yet, in 
contrast to ‘the acknowledged contribution of the … [freedom of press] for 
the democratization initiatives and smooth workings of a democratic 
government, the EPRDF-led government has been at war with members of 
the free press and their associations…hundred of members of the free press 
have been accused, detained, exiled and even died in prison cells’ (Merera, 
2003, p. 159). Criticizing the position of EPRDF against the freedom of 
press, Mebratu (2004a, p. 17) notes that: 
 The EPRDF recognizes freedom of press in so far as it feels that the 
press will not harm it. In that case, it doesn’t mind anything that is writing 
by it. In fact, it portrays this as “proof” of its democratic way of doing 
things. But when the freedom to express thought begins to exercise in a 
manner which is “trouble some” which shows it in a bad light, it sucks, 
bristles, elbows, lashes out.    
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As a continued war of EPRDF against the freedom of press as well as 
its stands to curtain their freedom of associations, with regard to the current 
draft press law the article (ibid.) also goes to say that: 
In the draft press law, the EPRDF not only deals with freedom of 
expression but asserts only it alone knows how and decide for journalists 
how they should be organized in an association. It insists that unless an 
Ethiopian who wants to make a living by investing in the media forms a 
business organization and structure the organization‘s ownership of shares 
not in accordance with investment or commercial reserved to itself the power 
to determine hoe editors, journalist, vendor may carry on their activities as 
well as which foreign press product may or may not be imported into 
Ethiopia. This has exposed the EPRDF’s dictatorial nature of restricting the 
public’s right to know. 
 
Weak Institutional Frameworks: Parliament and Anti-corruption 
Commission 
In relation to the prevailing aborted democratization process, one of 
the weak institutional fretworks of the current political system of country is 
the parliament. Contrary to its nature, as the superior organ of the political 
system of a particular country that creates the executive arm of the 
government, the parliament of Ethiopia has been a subservient nominal body 
that can only put a rubber stamp on decision which had already been made 
by the powerful executive. As can been observed practically, more than 75% 
of the seats of the parliament are controlled by the EPRDF, that have been 
giving adherence to unforgiving party discipline of democratic centralism, 
the legislative apparatus function as an instrument that leads legality to what 
the executive does and wishes to do in the name of a parliamentarian 
arrangement. Such kind of political drama is the outcome of the EPRDF 
political calculus in which its “leadership discuss in and decide before hand 
what they want to be decided by parliament… [since the EPRDF members of 
parliament] have the obligation, dictated by the principles of ‘democratic 
centralism’ to accept and respect as well as unanimously approve these 
decisions given outside parliament” (Mebratu, 2004b:17). It is possible to 
generalize that everything has been at the back of the parliament and come to 
parliament for a formal deliberation. In the current Ethiopian political 
culture, the party and the executives are fused together; the parliament of 
Ethiopia is a half dead entity that lacks lively debates on issues.  
The Ethiopian parliament is also incapable to scrutinize the 
executives, if the various governmental institutions have not implemented 
the laws that it enacts previously. In practice, to over sight their activities 
with regard to the implementation of the enacted laws necessitates the 
respective institutions to present their performance reports in the house of the 
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parliament though the executives are not responsive and the parliament itself 
does not explicitly exercise its bestowed rights to get answers and make 
accountable the culprit party. In view of this unresponsive nature of the 
executives, Mebratu (2004b: 13) noted that: 
The executives, being appointed by the party’s apparatus, does not 
accord respect to parliament, which it uses just for the sake of declaring that 
it was “appointed by it”. It is not responsive to parliament’s queries; when it 
wants to, it declines to present a report to it scoffs at it. So, it is hard to say 
that in practice [Ethiopia] parliament is the body having the rights power.   
The Ethiopian parliament was unable to realize its supremacy over 
the executives, and failed to implement one of its core responsibility to 
control the executive apparatus of the government from abusing power and 
its entrusted responsibility. Thus, there is always the room for the executive 
apparatus to deliberate whatever doomed necessary laws for its own 
governmental advantage, to the extent of compromising the provisions 
enshrined in the constitution and to perpetuate its manipulation for the 
security of its survival at the helm of the political power hierarchy as long as 
it takes. 
In connection to the weak institutional framework, the other 
instrument for the perpetuation of corruption as well as  a façade institutional 
set up that seemed the government in power as a ‘politically wiling’ to fight 
corruption is the anti-corruption commission. However, creating institution 
that fights corruption is a commendable conspicuous act, from its inception 
the adherence as well as the urgent institutionalization of the anti-corruption 
endeavor in EPRDF is a continuation of the incumbent government hidden 
agenda of using institution as instrument of the survival of the regime in 
power. This is due to the fact that at that particular point in time, the regime 
former Deputy Prime Minister was on trial for grand corruption offences, the 
ruling party was not rushed to institutionalize anti-corruption agency as the 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi explained at length to parliament that he had 
repeatedly cautioned the culprit but that when he became recalcitrant, he was 
held accountable for the transgression by the Office of Attorney General. 
Yet, the Federal Ethics and Ant-Corruption Commission (FEAC) start its 
first allegations of corruption of those ‘dissident factions’ members, which 
have been ousted from the EPRDF party as instrument agencies of the 
regime in power to disable a political rival under the cover of fighting 
corruption in Ethiopia. FEAC is the new instrument of the EPRDF that could 
be used to revenge political opponents. In its previous proclamation, the 
FEAC providing for ‘special procedures and rules of evidence on anti-
corruption had nothing to say about bail’ (Tilahun, 2004, p. 26). Once the 
accused political dissidents ‘post a bail and get chance to go out of prison, 
the executive took a measure of force… [and] ordered its members of 
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parliament to convene on the weakened to immediately prepare a draft 
law…[that] denying person arrested on suspension of committing a 
corruption offences the right from being released on bail’ (Mebratu, 2004c: 
13). With this kind of ‘capturing the legislative powers of the state, the 
political groups in powers [EPRDF] will use legislation to lock out rival 
political groups’ (Garamfalvi, 1997, p. 10). Thus, FEAC made remarkable 
gesture of playing its institutional role to the best satisfaction of the 
executives, by shutting of the political opponent of the Prime Minister 
behind the prison door by denying the right to bail of these dissidents against 
the provision enshrined under Article 19(6) of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia Constitution. Vaghan and Tronvoll (2003, p. 101-102) 
noted the instrumental role of FEAC wrote that: 
Corruption charges [in the current Ethiopia] have been leveled 
exclusively at those on “the wrong side” of political divide; that the 
allegations on which the cases are based on relatively trivial or empty and 
such as could be leveled at almost any one in a position of authority; the 
legislation establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission, and modifying 
habeas corpus provisions for those subjects to its investigation, was rushed 
through explicitly in order to keep political dissidents out of circulation, and 
was in any case “unconstitutional”   
When one can closely filter out the government will in tackling the 
‘perceived causes or effects of corruption at a system level’ (Kpundeh, 1998, 
p. 92) other than a short-term political significance, he/she gets that its 
exclusive concern on corruption of economic type has made its endeavor 
rhetoric one. The crux of the matter here is that the political will of a 
particular government on anti-corruption policy’s determined by the ‘rule of 
the political game, such as the prevalence of a democratic institution and 
context specific incentives’ (ibid.); thus, this necessitates a participative 
political culture, a period free and fair election, effective check and balance 
among the three strands of government, a distinctive private and public 
realm; a dynamic civil society. Most significantly, these democratic practices 
are the essence of democratization and ‘in itself present an opportunity to 
control systematic corruption by opening up the activities of public officials 
to public scrutiny and accountability…democracies, more so than any other 
political system, are able to deter corruption through institutionalized checks 
and balance and other meaningful accountability…reduce secrecy, monopoly 
and discretion’ (Pope, 1997, p. 27). In spite of all these advantages of 
democratic institutionalization of statehood that can be instituted through the 
process of democratic election which gives birth to a democratic body 
politics, it is the norm in Ethiopia that ‘elections that can be manipulated in 
advance, long before Election Day’ (Pausewang, Tronvoll, & Aalen, 2002. p. 
9). These kinds of incidences of manipulation which have been raised now 
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and then are purely political corruptions that are destined to realize a political 
state capture for the benefit of the ruling power that has always the motive 
and the means. Yet, surprisingly, such kind of incidences of manipulation 
has not been considered by the EPRDF led government as a corruption act, 
and it is left out in the rhetoric anti-corruption policy of the incumbent 
regime and was not included in the FEAC mandates. FEAC is non-mandated 
to investigate political corruption as well as elections manipulation and 
rigging, it is lurking only in the economic pattern of corruption and 
illegitimate to deal the political cancer of Ethiopia.   The ruling power 
relegated these bigger problems to be dealt by the National Electoral Board 
(NEB) whose higher officials are appointed by the EPRDF dominated and 
controlled House of People Representative up on the nomination by the 
Prime Minister. NEB, being part and parcel of the core institutional 
framework that reinstates the foundation of the political state capture when 
ever election come in; has always been under strong hold of the EPRDF. It is 
unlikely that NEB refines the recidivist behavior of the EPRDF. It is also 
expected from a hierarchical arranged election structure to comprise of 
government and a party intermingled apparatus with full of the ruling party 
members, supporters and opportunist sympathizers.  
With its narrow mandated realm of administration type of economic 
corruption; the FEAC is not also autonomous to handle all the corruption 
offences. In its restricted endeavor, there has been preferential handling of 
corruption offences as well as extreme care employed not to be missed up 
with the “restricted areas”, since it has been already tied-up to the EPRDF 
through a long string that can be manifested through the appointment of 
political sympathizers and members of the ruling party to lead the FEAC. In 
view of such activities of FEAC in which it has been selectively handling 
corruption offences, Mebratu (2004c, p. 24) argued that:  
The commission inability to gain a full measure of independence has 
led to the assumption that instead of “taking an aim” against all corrupt 
persons it has been made to discharge its responsibility or to focus its 
attention selectively. It is hard to say that the commission is operating 
unhampered given that persons who are similarly “strained” are not 
similarly viewed and adjudged because the question whether they are 
“supporters or opponents” also come into the picture. Exerting pressure on 
a commission establishing by law using political clout and preventing it from 
functioning at full capacity by itself merits to be considered as  [a political] 
corruption.  
Thus, FEAC is a kind of anti-corruption rhetoric move, and indeed 
many of the outcries and mobilization against corruption were staged or 
triggered by the incumbent government in a well-orchestrated effort to use 
corruption symbolically to divert attentions away from itself in the wake of 
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post Ethio-Eritrea war political difficulties of disabling a political rival under 
the cover of fighting corruption in Ethiopia as well as to sustain the political 
and economic support of the donors' community as well.  
 
Eroded the Rule of Law 
When we think of the other weak institution in Ethiopia, there come 
the pictures of the judiciary. The judiciary branch in Ethiopia has been 
historically weak and continues to lack public trust and respect. The judiciary 
subjugated to the executive branch of government in Ethiopia. This situation 
‘has fostered a weak judicial branch with reduced capacity to exercise 
genuine independence, as well as a reticence of other branches to treat the 
judiciary as either truly independent or co-equal’ (WB, 2004, p. 24). In 
current justice system of Ethiopia, ‘one of the major weaknesses 
observed…is the absence of a genuine commitment to enable the judiciary 
continue as an independent institution free from interference by the 
government or the ruling party’ (Mebratu, 2004d, p. 11).  
The continued interference of the EPRDF government in the justice 
system of Ethiopia is seen not only in the dismissal of ‘en mass young judges 
... for not being biddable to the instructions of the executives arm of the 
government’ (ibid.), but also in the continual chipping away of the powers of 
the judiciary and given them to the other governmental institutions to 
exercise the power to be ‘judges, jury and executioner’ all in one. Moreover, 
it also intervene in the daily work of the justice system in terms of 
perpetrating coercion to manipulate judicial decisions that favor the 
executives and the “the politically correct” persons. With this kind of an 
instrumental role of the justice system, the ruling party can perpetrate 
political corruption for the survival of the regimes by arresting and 
prosecuting those who are deemed to be against the ruling party; this is 
clearly articulated by the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in his writings of 
Bonapartism that described the EPRDF's ‘decaying’ in terms of justice and 
he remarked that, ‘member of ... [EPRDF] organization's senior leadership 
utilized ‘independence of the judiciary’ to have citizens he personally hated 
and he has not done any crime to speak of sentenced to tens of years of 
imprisonment’ (ibid).  
The other critical problem regarding the justice system is that because 
of retribution of many judges by EPRDF and its subsequent appointment of 
politically loyal judges resulted in a decaying situation that ‘many judicial 
positions have been filled with people who have had minimal, if any, legal 
training and experiences’ (WB, 2004. P. 19). This is due to the fact that, as 
far as EPRDF is concerned the essence of the appointment of judges is 
seemed to be ‘a reward for party services or as a precaution by the executives 
to ensure that it will have a friendly face on the bench if the rule of law is 
European Scientific Journal   December 2013  edition vol.9, No.35  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
266 
 
violated’ (Pope, 1997, p. 60). With all these justice hurdles that impede 
independence as well as inferior status vis-à-vis executive arm of the 
government; it is now in an incapable position to carry out its vested 
authority to usher the supremacy of the rule of law; and consequently 
exhibited a ‘repeated failure to adhere to the constitution’ (Mebratu, 2004d, 
p. 11).  
The filling up of the legal system with its political supporters and 
sympathizers makes the EPRDF to bestowed ‘a powerful influence in 
judicial decision-making, potentially rendering judges unwilling to reach 
decisions that might be seen to make them out as critical of the government’ 
(Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 100). As a consequence of the EPRDF 
continued intervention in the modus operandi of the justice system, what has 
been resulted, is not only the ‘near paralysis of the courts, with most citizens 
being denied the full protections supposed to be provided in the constitution 
... [but also] did give Ethiopia the distinction of being the African country 
with the largest number of untrained judges’ (Vestal, 1999, p. 121). With 
respect to the failures observed in the Ethiopia justice system Mebratu 
(2004d, p. 12) upholds his comments as follows:  
The EPRDF's “era of justice” has been that of assailants than 
victims, of defendants than plaintiffs. Today cases are adjourned for long 
months and customers have come to regard frequently going to courts 
needlessly as “putting on attire”. The “golden era of justice,” which the 
EPRDF's leaderships crowned about when the party took the reign of power, 
is still not around the corner. Although the computerization of service 
delivery and erection of signboards, which are being hyped as improvements 
in the rendering of justices, are commendable they cannot be the main 
indicators of the prevalence of justices. And they cannot do away with our 
problems of a dearth in justice. There can be a reliable justices system when 
a reliable judiciary is in places. But the EPRDF has been unable to achieve 
results apart from perpetually saying, “efforts are being made”. It may 
require knowing the duration of the EPRDF's stay in power to know when 
these “efforts” will be completed.  
On its parts, in connection to the readily identifiable problems of 
governance in Ethiopia, Neway (2001, p. 9); a Chief Economic Advisor to 
the Prime Minister even if he attached it with the inadequacy and in 
adherence to procedural matter, also acknowledged the failures as well as the 
dearth of justice in Ethiopia during the era of EPRDF's rule and came up 
with the following careful conclusion:  
We can now readily identify the problems of governance in Ethiopia. 
[ ... If we start with administration of justices, corruption is apparently 
widespread. …Implementation of rules and delivery of services by the civil 
service is defective. In both the judiciary and the civil service, internal 
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mechanisms of enforcement of rules are weak either because the procedures 
are inadequate. Even when they are inadequate, they are not adhered to. For 
instances, a court cases can be lengthened out by a simple expediency of 
postponement of court hearings.[ ... ] Regulations tend to be enforced 
intermittently, selectively, and partially by government agencies.[... ] As to 
external mechanics which would ensure that the judiciary and the civil 
service enforce rules properly; these are not well developed in Ethiopia.  
In other aspect of the erosion of the rule of law and its selective 
nature, what has been seen so far in the EPRDF rule is that it discriminates 
between friends and foes in implementing the law. In addition to this, the 
rigor of the law is applied selectively, ‘the EPRDF believes that it has carte 
beanche authority to selectively apply, stretch or render in effective at will 
any laws that serve as instruments to realize revenges and hatred while it 
negatively forgets to implement the other laws’ (Mebratu, 2004d, p. 19). As 
this same author (ibid., p. 12-19) elaborates this injustice, he writes that: 
The EPRDF has shown several times that it has the boldness and 
muscles, though not the mental restraint, to violate any ironclad restriction if 
doing so is in its interest. If violates the lease law, the tax law, the custom 
law and so forth. It does not seem to have the energy or concern to make this 
country a place where the law is respected, where citizens are ruled by a set 
of abiding laws. [... ] Whenever it wants to beleaguer someone, it “abhors” 
wiping the dust off laws that seem to be detrimental to its interest and read 
them let alone bemoaning the fact that they are neglected. How can justice 
become prevalent when the EPRDF enforces only the laws that serve as 
instruments to realize revenge and hatred while it negligently forgets to 
implement the other laws? For the EPRDF, justice does not have a 
homogeneous meaning.  
As a summery remark of the impact of political corruption that erodes 
the rule of law, the OECD argues the similar situation of the judiciary system 
that are characterized by failure, in-expeditiously as well as non-
independence like Ethiopia, the ‘inefficiencies in the legal system, such as 
lack of predictably, delays in handling court cases and lack of enforcement 
of law decisions, increases business costs, discourages investors and obstruct 
development’ (CWS, 2000, p. 96). 
 
The Politicization of the Civil Service 
As far as neo-patrimonial rule of EPRDF is concerned, it has the 
relevance to explain its political appointment and it can reveal itself through 
the EPRDF ‘policy of filling all higher and middle level posts with appointee 
on the bases of political and ethnic consideration’ (Meheret & Paulos, 2000, 
p. 24). This policy of EPRDF was repeatedly communicated as a mark of 
uniqueness of the public sector appointment by the Prime Minister Meles 
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Zenawi and he asserted that ‘for him the yardstick by which someone is 
measured in his political loyalty only’ (Mebratu, 2004e, p. 11); so that as 
long as he is loyal, he can be illiterate in order to be crown as a state minister 
for the EPRDF. This kind of relationship, where for the appointee client, the 
job represents an important asset of reward for his continued loyalty and 
support of the regime in power, where as for the patron EPRDF, the 
unquestioned and unflinching loyalty of the appointee and the continued 
support of the regime that matter most.  The hallmark of this kind of 
arrangement is ‘using public resources to secure political survival, and 
rewarding appointment behavior and securing political loyalty’ (Abu, 2001, 
p. 17).  In this situation the government in power that amass public resource 
as well as the consideration of the state as a food by the opportunist 
appointee; the ruling power mobilizes political support via the public office 
as a ‘bargain chips that government provide to the public and hence develop 
client-patron relationship’ (ibid., p. 17-18). With this framework of neo-
patrimonial rule, ‘political patronage is tempered with meritocracy, but the 
overriding criteria consists of political loyalty and the right connections’ 
(Dube, 1999, p. 72) in the ministerial appointments, membership of board of 
directors, civil service appointment, the rewarding of scholarship as well as 
management position in NGOs and civil organizations. However, this kind of 
appointment of the EPRDF that has not been ‘considered merit and integrity, 
infringes the modern criteria of competence: the right person in the right 
place who has not been given a ‘leg up’’ (van Duyne, 2001, p. 86). As a 
manifestation of this infringement, the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi ‘tried 
to defend this practice saying that if the appointee cannot perform he would 
be assigned as an advisor [for another incapable appointee as leg up]’ 
(Mebratu, 2004e, p. 23). As far as the EPRDF is concerned, the existing 
modus operand of political appointment of a ‘person whom it knows cannot 
do the job without being assigned an aide under or parallel a person to him 
amounts to squandering the country’s resources’ (ibid.).  
In addition to the mobilization of political support with the expense 
of the public resource, the EPRDF can go extreme to protect its clients 
‘suspected of involvement in corruption ... [it] issues orders preventing 
suspects acquitted by a court on charges of corruption from setting foot 
outside the court compound in violation of the court's orders’ (Mebratu, 
2004e, p. 24). EPRDF that talks about voluminously for the fight against 
corruption, ‘if it is in its interest . . . it does not want to hurt someone [a 
political appointee] mixed up in corruption, it will bargain and settle with 
him’ (Mebratu, 2004e, p. 11). Such kind of a clandestine rescue operation of 
EPRDF ‘from the claws of the law through the weapons of nolle prosequi’ 
(Mulei & Andrew, 2000, p. 116) is a political corruption of perpetrating a 
direct violation of the rule of law of the country.  
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The political patronage that has been exercised by the EPRDF as a 
kind of redistribution schemes of public resources to its political supporters 
as well as a means of controlling the civil service through a politically 
entrusted ‘remote control of men and women’; it give rise the politicization 
of the civil service. This policy of deprofessionalization of the civil service 
system that ‘will undoubtedly result in the civil service being filled with 
mediocre personnel whose card is none other than their ascribed qualification 
of ethnic background or political loyalty’ (Meheret & Paulos, 2000, P. 8). It 
has produced various negative legacies against the development and 
institutionalizations of a rational-legal bureaucracy model of civil service in 
Ethiopia. One of the consequences is that has led many public servants to 
openly align with the regime in power and like the “dog barking” for its 
masters and they totally against any other contender political opponents of 
the regime in order to demonstrate their loyalty. This kind of alignment of 
the civil service to whatever the incumbent government breathes has in turn 
‘the most disastrous long-term effects of political appointment throughout 
the civil service, ... creates a situation where many professionals once 
dismissed will be subjected to unemployment, imprisonments and exile to 
other countries’ ( Meheret & Paulos, 2000, p. 25). As chain of reaction, what 
come next from the arbitrary rejection and dismissal of public servants due to 
the expendability nature of political appointee of civil servant in Ethiopia is 
that, it led to the intermittent interruption of institutional programmed as well 
as a short-term organizational tumble down as a result of the loss of 
organizational memory. Moreover, ‘the other negative consequence of 
political appointment is the humiliation that has created on career officials’ 
(ibid.). This means, ‘those career officials who claim the position because of 
their experience, merit and qualification have suffered when somebody with 
no sufficient competence and doesn't deserve the appointment takes the 
claimed position’ (ibid.). In addition to the feeling of humiliations, it also 
brings about ‘the feeling of professional inadequacy, a sense of insecurity, 
and attitude of inertia to public service and spurred the brain drain’ (ibid.). 
Finally, a causal observation of political appointment in a country like 
Ethiopia suggested that it is one of the prominent causes for corruption in the 
public service. From this angle, the political appointee officials and 
bureaucracies of their position motivated by their expendability of occasional 
dismissal and demotions, the feeling among them as being temporary drives 
by towards corruption and administrative frauds. This may be the case, 
corruption ‘appears as an integral element in relations to political powers, 
with state property and jobs allocated to ethnic or political supporters in 
networks of patron-client relations’ (Harsch, 1999, p. 69). Thus, political 
appointments as the official policy of the EPRDF that depicted the regime 
vested interest of politicizing the civil service creates the situation that can in 
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turn become the breeding ground for the proliferation of corruption in the 
civil service of Ethiopia. 
 
Monopolization of the Economy 
In the economic state capture, as part and parcel of the rhetoric 
political decentralization initiative, the EPRDF regime has also initiated a 
manipulated fiscal decentralization scheme, where the overall economic 
calculation of ‘the fiscal decentralization policy [EPRDF] is more political 
than economical’ (Merera, 2004, p. 261). Using its core position in the power 
hierarchy, unanimous position to set the agendas, political maneuvering and 
political hegemony, the TPLF (Tigray People Liberation Front) continued 
the unfair, uneven and non-transparent allocation of resources to its 
constituent region; and by doing so ‘the home base of the ruling party 
receive a disproportionate share of the national cake both directly or 
indirectly’ (ibid.). As Merera (2003, p. 175) noted on the uneven distribution 
of the decentralization of fiscal policy of the incumbent regime write that:  
The Oromo and the Southern Ethiopian People's Regions, which 
above all else are known for their production of coffee, which contributes 
more than 60% of the country's foreign exchange earnings get a clearly 
visible disproportionate share in return from the national treasury ... the 
Tigray region's per capita share of the federal subsidiary is constituently 
higher than Oromia, Amhara and SNNP regions, which constitute more than 
80% of the country's population.  
In the economic state capture, as a kind of self-aggrandizement its 
endeavor, the EPRDF is not only relied upon the country's national cake but 
also rationalize its economic capture indirectly through those organizations 
of GONGOs (Governmental Non-Government Organizations) which are 
claimed to be endowment funds by the TPLF Premier for the public 
propaganda consumption. These party owned business entities are not 
operating with legal framework of the endowment organization; rather 
operating in a non-competitive conducive atmosphere using their owner 
award of different projects, purchases and easy pass of the economic 
bureaucracy. The conglomerates business empire EFFORT, which came to 
exist in 1995, is the one currently operates in Ethiopia as a 'business 
conspiracy' that institutionalized the economic state capture of the TPLF and 
continues its monopoly and dominance over the private business operating in 
this country. In their studies, Pauswang, Tronvoll and Aalen (2002, p. 231-
232), explained this situations by referring to Gunther Schroder work, wrote 
that:  
The state has sold most of the former state companies and parasitical 
enterprises but, paradoxically, the ruling party and its affiliates have bought 
most of these enterprises, directly or through individual members ... These 
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businesses, including several important services to the control population 
such as the importation, production and distribution of fertilizers have been 
integrated in strong party-controlled business conglomerates.  
In regard to the above argument of the EPRDF economic state 
capture, through the ownership of the different companies, which are 
privatized by the same ruling party; TPLF/EPRDF played a shadow theater 
of putting the country's resources from the right pocket to the left, followed a 
clandestine policy of transferring the state assets to its party ownership. 
Specifically in Ethiopia, where the assets of the country's being the assets of 
the ruling party, the major companies linked to the TPLF are 32, those linked 
to ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement) are 5; those linked to 
the OPDO (Oromo People Democratic Organization) are 5 and those linked 
to the SEPDF (Southern Ethiopian People Democratic Front) to are 2 
(Merera, 2003).  
In view of the framework of the economic state capture project of 
EPRDF, one can argue that, it was the ruling party itself in his Political 
Parties Registration Proclamation No.46/1996 promulgated that a political 
party, which has attained legal personality, may not directly or indirectly 
engage in commercial and industrial activity. Yet, it has been the EPRDF 
itself that ‘has set up huge organizations, ostensibly as endowments, by the 
name EFFORT, Tiret, Dinsho ...where in political and economic corruption 
are widely reflected’ (Mebratu, 2004f, p. 24). These organizations as party-
orchestrated commercial activities of business conspiracy of the EPRDF 
regime that perpetuates party monopoly over the economy of the country are 
not as such endowments as it has been claimed by the ruling party. They are 
not transferred to the people of Tigray, Amhara, Oromo as well as the 
Southern People Nation and Nationalities, rather they are still owned and 
managed by the EPRDF, for instance EFFORT ‘is governed by a 32 member 
Board of Directors elected from TPLF and its mass associations; it is 
managed by an executive committees whose seven members have also been 
members of TPLF central committee’ (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 76). 
The Prime Minster public deliberation, spearheaded against private sector 
‘'rent seeking’ tendency, he clearly spelt that rent seeker is ascribed in one 
that rationalize his economic advantage using the political backing of 
officials, of course his argument is one that suffices ‘rent-seeking has indeed 
become a euphemism for ‘corruption’’ (Szefel, 1998, p. 224). Where in their 
daily business undertaking, by the same token ‘no one comes close to the 
business organization affiliated with the EPRDF [in their perpetration of 
rent-seeking activities] namely TPLF's EFFORT, ANDM's Tiret and 
OPDO's Dinsho’ (Mebratu, 2004f, p. 26). As Mebratu (ibid.) cites as the 
very clear manifestation of their rent-seeking activities of these organization 
as follows:  
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The organization can secure bank loans; win tenders, rent and use 
government owned buildings not because they compete equally with other 
Ethiopian business but because everything is at their disposal on the snap of 
a finger, because they are privileged to use the country's political setting to 
their advantage. The manner in which they are availed with better access to 
credit and be more competitive than other business using this political 
privilege is an expression of the economic facet of corruption.  
In the current economic state capture in Ethiopia, what can discern is 
that a party business benefited from ‘preferential access to government 
controlled credit facilities, preferential treatments in obtaining operational 
and import/export license and customs clearances; precedence over private 
competitors in regard to government contracts; transfer of REST47 transport 
capacities to TPLF enterprises through manipulated government auctions; 
governmental pressure on international governmental and nongovernmental 
donors to work with EPRDF controlled companies, NGOs and Charities’ 
(Melissa & Barkan, 1997, p. 14-15). Commenting this situation and the 
dearth of the public verses private realm distinction as well as the mingling 
of these two spheres in Ethiopia, Melissa & Barkan (1998, p. 19-20) in their 
studies of Corruption and Political Finance in Africa noted that:  
The party control in business, or of the party controlling government, 
phrases which presumes some separate existence of the abstract entities of a 
party, business, and government, when in fact the same small pool of people 
may be simultaneously the principal actors in government, party and 
business, fluidly regrouping as needed. At the limit, the same actor may 
control both party and the government, commingling party, government and 
personal finances and drawing on all three for spending indiscriminately... 
Parties capture the state and legalize their use of state resources.....engaged 
in coordinated self-dealing through manipulation of their multiple 
institutional membership and roles.  
In the economic scene, the effect of the perpetrated political 
corruption on the part of EPRDF, is the ‘emergence of new monopolistic and 
unfair trading practices by the ruling part’ (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 
78); however, in its defense of such critics the EPRDF ‘are quick to claim 
that the organization does not have a monopoly in any of the sectors in which 
it operates, and that, most business it is motivated not by the desire simply to 
make money, but by the mandates continuity to move on to develop new 
sectors which others would otherwise be unwilling or unable to work in, 
because of existing levels of underdevelopment’ (ibid.). Yet, the reality is not 
in compatibility with what the EPRDF claimed, rather it is indeed under the 
EPRDF dominance and control of the state of the economy. The economic 
                                                          
47 Relief Society of Tigray 
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liberalization slogan of the ruling party has not been genuine implemented, 
as it is manifested in the previous sections of this article, and as part and 
parcel of the party's economic goals ‘the EPRDF nuevo conversos of 
capitalism secretly established a substantial number of large “private” 
companies in the names of party cadres’ (Vestal, 1999, p. 173). An 
interesting account of Vestal (ibid.) regarding the monopolistic handful 
control of the state of economic of Ethiopia writes that:  
For public consumption, the EPRDF extols the virtues of economic 
liberalization, a free market, and the privatization of state owned 
enterprises. Behind the scenes, however, most of the Ethiopian economy is 
under state ownership or control.... Key sectors of the economy, including 
banking, manufacturing, foreign trade, mining, and transportation are either 
dominated by EPRDF-owned companies or controlled by the state…. [The 
EPRDF], with its nuevo conversos and crony capitalists comfortably 
occupies “the commanding height of the economy”. The EPRDF has devised 
an encyclopedic stock of anti- comparative weapons, and they have adroitly 
found ways to restrain trade, rig markets and suppress competition. 
According to the international financial institutions, the EPRDF controls or 
owns more than 80% percent of the Ethiopian economy.  
In the other sector of the economy like the construction, agriculture, 
import and export, banks and insurance sectors are all dominated by the 
ruling party established companies. Using their owner political clout these 
business conglomerates rationalize economic prowess against legally 
established economic transactions.  
 
Conclusion 
Political corruption is a manifestation of political systems that are 
deficient in democratic power sharing formula, check and balance, 
accountable and transparent institution and procedures of the formal and 
ideal system of democratic governance. It is also manifested as a result of a 
self-serving political leadership and highly politicized, misdirected and 
inefficient state framework within which individual and group private 
interests have priority over the collective good. In contemporary Ethiopia, 
the political system of the country characterized by political and economic 
state capture, absences of genuine competition among political parties, weak 
and vulnerable national governance institutions, such as the parliaments, 
judiciary and corruption watchdog agencies. In practical terms, what came 
into existence is a favorable environment for the proliferations of corruption 
in Ethiopia. With this situation, what is there behind the scene is the ruling 
party that has been overtly and covertly engaged in the perpetuation of 
corruption as a consequence of prior political calculus of its own for the 
realization of its hegemonic aspiration. In an endeavor to manipulating the 
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democratic process for its own best advantage; the incumbent government 
has been engaged in gross infringement of the democratic process. It has 
been engaged in harassment and intimidation against political oppositions 
and their supporters, successive intimidation and cheating in elections, 
political repression and gross human rights violations, suppressions of 
freedom of association and expression as well as undermined the free press. 
This injustice of the EPRDF has been manifested through its political 
state capture that enables the party in power to have firm control over 
leading public positions and institutions at the national and sub-national 
levels through a plethora of patron and surrogate organizations as result of 
manipulations and flawed periodic elections, the PDO- system that was 
created out of a ‘weak, corrupt, captured prisoners of war with law 
education’ by the TPLF and its strategy of political exclusion of other 
contending groups. Using the outcome of the political state capture that 
instituted a de facto one-party rule in Ethiopia; the economic scene of the 
state capture made the EPRDF to run billions of dollars worth of business 
conglomerates as a party's private enterprises. In addition to these kinds of 
grand corruption activities, the EPRDF also engaged in neo-patrimonial 
patron-client network in its political appointments policy as well as the 
institutionalizations of impotent and subservient institutional frameworks. 
Within these systems of corruption, the EPRDF has found itself commanding 
of substantial sources of political and economic amenities on which others 
political supporters and sympathizers are forced to depend, and created its 
clear advantages in terms of institutional and resource capacity vis-à-vis its 
oppositions. As a previously intended outcome of political calculus, this 
could indeed facilitate realistic conditions for the perpetuation of EPRDF 
hegemony in the political as well as economic system of the country. Thus, 
what is said to be the cause of all these felonies as far as the political 
corruption of EPRDF is concerned, are the state capture in the political as 
well as the economic scene, neo-patrimonial rule and weak institutional 
framework of the regime in power. 
With respect to the implication of the regime political corruption in 
Ethiopia, what is apparent and clearly visible is that, it aborted the 
democratization process that was sponsored by itself. Starting from the 
inauguration of the Ethiopian second republic that opened the door to the 
current political game and the operating rules of the political system that 
enshrined democratic principles and procedures vis-à-vis the actual 
undertaking of the country's political system, the overall exercise is an 
imposition and strictly controlled affairs of the EPRDF that manipulated, 
dictated, and run the gear of the Ethiopian-ship for its own political and 
economic advantages. Apart from the manipulated procedural aspects of the 
Ethiopian political system, the successive periodic elections and process 
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carried out in this country are flawed. It also carried out manipulation and 
intimidation of elections in advance in order to alter the results and to make 
sure their final outcomes of ushering the uninterrupted tenure of the EPRDF. 
In addition to this, the regime in power also unable to protect the freedom of 
expression and assembly of the population; rather it emasculated and 
onslaughts independently organized associations of civic and political 
organization and continued suppression and harassing of the private press by 
routine use of detention and imprisonments of prohibitive fines and bail 
amount on journalist and editors. 
Being an active interventional in the modus operandi of the justice 
system in Ethiopia, the EPRDF has been also tightly controlling the judges 
by dismissing the previous one and appointing its political supporters and 
sympathizers. Apart from this, it denies legal immunity to judges and makes 
them an instrument of its extra-legal executions against its political 
opponents; it selectively enforces laws that already promulgated by itself and 
with the dismissal of qualified judges and prosecutors. It also brought about 
the near paralysis of the justice system and eroded the rule of law. In the 
economic state capture, the ruling party established companies and runs 
business conglomeration and these companies receive preferential treatments 
since they are privileged to use the country's political setting to their 
advantage and the party as well. This means that in the EPRDF rule, the 
political clout of the regime in power is often used by its party affiliated 
companies to gain economic advantage. As the consequence, like its 
hegemony in the political arena of the country, it made itself to dominate the 
economic scenery of the country and monopolizes the economy of Ethiopia. 
In its neo-patrimonial rule, the EPRDF also pursued political appointments 
based on loyalty and ethnic consideration to fill positions of the state 
bureaucracy, other than merit based rational-legal system recruitments which 
lead to a massive dismissal and demotion occasionally. It has also given rise 
to the motivation for rampant corruption in Ethiopia, as result of the 
expendability, inefficiency and incapacity of the political appointee.    
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